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Given probability density function (histogram) 
of available target values, 
 
     f(W) ~ W-t, 
 
find probability density function (histogram) of 
destroyed target values, 
 




Colonel Blotto Games of: 
     Powers and Shen (2006) 
     Powers and Gudmundsson (2008) 
 
Empirical Results 
Comparison of theory to observations of: 
     Kaizoji and Kaizoji (2008), w.r.t. f(W) 
     Johnson et al. (2005), w.r.t. g(W)	

Outline 
Powers and Shen (2006): 
     n targets; “volumes” Vi , values Wi ∝ Vi 
     Attackers allocate constrained Ai 
     Defenders allocate constrained Di      




      
     Targets cannot be partially damaged 
     Zero sum; gain/loss function Vλ, λ > 0  
     Case (i) All i attacked simultaneously;  
     Case (ii) Exactly one i attacked w.p. πi 
Colonel Blotto Game 
! 

















Theorem 1:  If all targets are attacked 
simultaneously, and λ = 1/2, then a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is formed by Ai ∝ (Vi)1/2 
and Di ∝ (Vi)1/2  
 
Theorem 2:  If exactly one target is attacked 
w.p. πi ∝ (Vi)1/2-λ, and λ ∈ (0, 1/2], then a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is formed by 
Ai ∝ (Vi)1/2 and Di ∝ (Vi)1/2 	

Cournot-Nash Equilibrium 
Theorem 3:  If the target-selection probability 
πi is endogenized as a strategy of the 





Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (Cont.) 
Assumptions: 
 
     n targets; “volumes” Vi , values Wi ∝ Vi 
     Attackers allocate constrained Ai 
     Defenders allocate unconstrained Di  





     Attacked targets at least partially 
          damaged 
     Zero sum; gain/loss function Vλ, λ > 0 
     Exactly one i selected w.p. πi	






  for  Ai >
# k 1Di2
2k2Viq
Theorem 1:  If exactly one target is attacked 
w.p. πi ∝ (Wi)r, and λ > 0, then a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium is formed by Ai ∝ (Wi)a and 
Di ∝ (Wi)d, where r, a, and d are chosen so that 
pi = 0 
 
Theorem 2:  Given that the p.d.f. of target 
values is f(W) ~ W-t, the attackers can 
maximize their expected gain in Theorem 1 by 
selecting r = t’ - 1 - λ for any t’ ≥ t	

Cournot-Nash Equilibrium 
From the first-order conditions of Theorem 1, 
we know 
 
     2d + r + λ = q + 2a 
     d = (q + a)/2  
 
In conjunction with Theorem 2, we then obtain 
 
Corollary 1:  In Cournot-Nash equilibrium,  
Ai ∝ (Wi)t’-1 and Di ∝ (Wi)(q+t’-1)/2, where 
πi ∝ (Wi)t’-1-λ	

Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (Cont.) 
Assume: 
     q = 1 
     t’ = t = 2.35 (see Kaizoji and Kaizoji, 2008) 
     λ = 0.5 for peacetime govts. (risk prone) 
     λ = 1.5 for wartime govts. (risk averse) 
 
Then: 
     Ai ∝ (Wi)t’-1 = (Wi)1.35 
     Di ∝ (Wi)(q+t’-1)/2 = (Wi)1.175 
     πi ∝ (Wi)t’-1-λ = (Wi)0.85 in peacetime 
     πi ∝ (Wi)t’-1-λ = (Wi)-0.15 in wartime 
Hypothetical Parameter Values 
Johnson et al. (2005) found that the p.d.f. of 
destroyed (rather than available) targets is 
     g(W) ~ W-2.5  
          for less-developed wartime countries 
     g(W) ~ W-1.71 
          for more-developed wartime countries 
 
To compare our estimates with these 
observations, consider that 
     g(W) = π f(W) ~ (Wi)-0.15(Wi)-2.35 = (Wi)-2.5  
          for more-developed wartime countries 
Empirical Literature 
In both peacetime and wartime, government 
defenders tend to allocate forces in slightly 
lower proportion to high-value targets than do 
terrorist attackers. 
 
In peacetime, terrorist attackers tend to give 
substantial weight to high-value (“trophy”) 
targets; however, such targets actually are 
avoided in wartime. 
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